Ultimate Moral Laws and Logic
Wooded Path in Autumn, by Hans Anderson Brendekilde, 1909
A few days ago, I witnessed a confrontation on the evening news where two opposing groups viewed the other as morally repugnant. But to what were they comparing each other's moral views?
I will try something slightly off the beaten track here that will likely appeal to only a subset of readers––those who enjoy pure logic and rational thinking.
An undeniable fact about humanity is that we often observe incidents that we call "unjust," "unethical," or "morally wrong," all of which some philosophers categorize under the general heading of "evil." But believing that instances of evil and injustice occur is nonsense unless there is a very real standard of morality that is being violated.
If we define evil and injustice as violations of moral laws, then we can summarize this first point in a logical syllogism as follows:
If there are no moral laws to violate, then complaining about evil and injustice is nonsense.
But our complaints about instances of evil and injustice do not seem to be mere nonsense.
Therefore, there must be a standard of morality that is being violated.
So what are the grounds for these moral laws that are being violated? Could they reside within the individual?
A. Individual moral truth?
The concept of 'my truth' has become fashionable now. Each person has their own values and we are expected to respect the values of other individuals, even if we do not hold them ourselves. But judging from the incident on the evening news, this is absurd and cannot work in reality.
An absurd game: Imagine sending a group of children outdoors to play a game where each child is required to make up their own personal rules and all rules are equally valid. Accusations of cheating, of course, would be ridiculous since the rules of the game are a matter of each person's fancy at any particular moment. Even keeping score would be nonsense if goals were only an arbitrary concept, varying from person to person. Clearly, such a game would be absurd if there were no generally agreed-upon rules.
If we observe a person who genuinely treats all people with equal respect and affection, we tend to think that they are morally better than a person who openly hates people of certain ethnicities. But here is the catch––the moment we say that one person is morally better than the other, we assume there is a moral standard that is higher than an individual's own moral 'truth', and some people come closer to that standard than others. So moral truth must be better than the individual's subjective moral fancies.
We can summarize this in the form of a logical syllogism as follows:
We can say that some individuals are more moral than others only if there is a moral standard we can compare them to that is higher than the individual's own moral 'truth'.
Some people are, in fact, more moral than others.
Therefore, there must be a moral standard that is higher than the individual’s own moral truth that we can compare each person’s morality to.
So what are the grounds for this better moral standard? Could it be the society within which we, as individuals, live?
B. Could morality be a social contract?
Contractarianism is the view that morality is the outcome of an unwritten social contract whereby individuals in a group can get along together. But this, too, is problematic. We think that some societies are better (more just or moral) than others. We even believe the morality of our own society has varied, depending upon what point in history we consider. For example, some, such as my ethics professor in university, have stated that we are witnessing a global ethical decline.
I once participated in a formal debate at Simon Fraser University, defending the view that there is an ultimate standard of morality that spans history and civilizations. My opponent, a philosopher of ethics, argued that morality is an unwritten social contract. Given his view, my question to him was as follows...
"Is treating women as chattel always wrong, or is it only wrong in our society at this point in history, but in a future society that thinks differently, it might be right?"
His refusal to concede it might be right in the future, depending upon what society thought at that time, was an indication that despite his own contractarian view of morality, he still held to an even higher moral law, and by that higher standard, treating women as chattel is always wrong for all societies at all points in history, even if some societies thought it was fine.
When we say one society is better than another, we assume there is an even higher moral standard against which we can compare individual societies and conclude that some come nearer to that standard than others.
We can summarize this point with the following logical syllogism:
We can say that some societies in history are more just or moral than others only if there is an even higher moral standard that spans history and civilizations that we can compare them to and conclude that some are more moral than others.
Some societies actually are morally better than others throughout history.
Therefore, there must be an even higher moral standard that spans history and civilizations against which we can compare individual societies and say that some are more moral than others.
So what is this higher standard that spans human individuals and civilizations? Could morality be an evolutionary outcome?
C. Darwinian Evolution?
Evolution is unjust: Some would say that evolution has taught us that we can survive better if we all mutually help each other out. But when we look at nature, we see many species that survive perfectly well in an unjust social group. For example, growing up on a beef farm, I observed that there was always a 'pecking order' in the herd of cattle. If a new cow was introduced, there was an immediate fight between the boss cow and the newcomer, and it didn't usually stop with just one fight. Other high-ranking cows might also ensure that the newcomer knew its place.
In general, there are species that practice mutual cooperation when it comes to survival against nature or enemies, but within every one of them is a brutal ‘pecking order’ that is anything but egalitarian or just (as we understand justice), whether we speak of whales, Chimpanzees, wild bison, or ants.
Evolution favors the most powerful, strong, or intimidating individuals that are best able to pass on their genes. The beneficial outcome is that the weak and sickly are continually weeded out and the fitness of the species is more or less preserved by the most powerful––hardly a model standard of justice. Within a herd of wild Bison, for example, the most powerful bulls will breed many cows, while other, less impressive bulls may never breed at all. The pecking order in human societies is more complex, with athletes, music stars, wealthy men, and powerful men often at the top. Moral values seek to mitigate this problem.
Morality is not in our genes: Some years ago, I read a fascinating article discussing the data from daycare centres. If morality is an evolutionary outcome, then it should be encoded in our genes and we will predict that we will observe it emerge naturally in our young children before we ‘taint’ them with our own traditions and community ethics. So what do we actually observe? My own experience in raising six children matched the data from daycare centres perfectly. It was crystal clear that we do not have to teach children to take each others' toys, to hit each other, or to lie––selfish behavior came naturally. As parents, we had to work hard to teach them not to take each other's toys, not to hit each other, and not to lie. There are exceptions to the general rule, of course, some children are very compliant, sensitive, and want to please, but those are often dominated by the forceful, less sensitive, and more intimidating children, exactly as we witness in the wild.
I seldom agree with Richard Dawkins, but he nailed it when he wrote this about evolution and morality,
"I shall argue that a predominant quality to be expected in a successful gene is ruthless selfishness.... Be warned that if you wish, as I do, to build a society in which individuals cooperate generously and unselfishly towards a common good, you can expect little help from biological nature. Let us try to teach generosity and altruism because we are born selfish." (1)
We can summarize these points with two logical syllogisms:
Evolution fails morally:
A predominant quality of evolution is ruthless selfishness.
If (1) is the case, then evolution fails to produce a high moral standard.
Therefore evolution fails as a moral standard.
Falsified by observations:
If morality is a result of evolution, then generosity and justice should be natural within our children.
The data say that selfishness, hitting, and lying come naturally to our children; we have to teach them generosity and justice.
Therefore, the data falsify the theory that morality is a result of evolution.
Well then, what could be the grounds for moral laws that transcend history, and civilization, and that are higher than the ruthlessness of Darwinian evolution? Could it be the 'no harm' principle?
D. The 'no harm' principle?:
My ethics professor believed that the basis for morality is the 'no harm' principle--we are free to do what we wish provided it does not harm anyone else, including infringing on other people’s freedom to do what they wish. But there is a problem ...
The bus problem: Imagine a crowded city transit bus. As an elderly man makes his way down the aisle, a young man sticks his leg out in an attempt to trip the man. Happily, the elderly man steps over the leg and no harm is done. However, a very compassionate and generous person a little further down the aisle accidentally trips the man, much to their horror, and the man is badly hurt in the fall.
One person intended to harm but failed and the other did not intend to harm but did. So according to the 'no harm' principle, which person is more evil?
Contrary to the 'no harm' principle, we feel that the person who intended to harm but failed is more evil than the compassionate, innocent person who, much to their distress, caused great harm. We can summarize this with the following logical syllogism:
A person who intends to harm but fails is more evil than a person who does not intend to harm but does.
If (1) is the case, then there must be a moral law even higher than the 'no harm' principle that judges the thoughts and intentions of a person.
Therefore, there is a moral law that is higher than the 'no harm' principle that judges the thoughts and intentions of a person.
E. Ultimate criteria:
We can still go further in our logical search for ultimate moral laws. An abductive argument is an argument that reasons to the best conclusion. There may be several possibilities but the case for most of them may be very tenuous or even absurd in contrast to an option that is more straightforward and has attractive explanatory power.
Using abductive reasoning, we can infer the following conclusions:
Requires a mind:
Moral laws are only useful to minds capable of moral deliberation.
If (1) is the case, then the best explanation for something that can only be appreciated by minds, is that moral laws come from a mind that is very interested in how humans behave.
Therefore, the origin of ultimate moral laws must be a mind that is very interested in how humans behave.
Requires free will:
It is of no use to tell a computer program not to give bad results, as a method to obtain good reliable software, simply because the program is completely determined by the code that controls it. No moral deliberation is possible. Moral laws are only useful to minds capable of freely making moral decisions, bad or good. So logically,
Moral laws are only useful to free-will agents (agents who can make decisions that a) were not determined by prior conditions and b) who could have decided otherwise).
The best explanation for something only useful to free will agents is that it must come from some other agent that, itself, has free will.
Therefore, the best explanation for moral laws is that they originate from a free-will agent.
Gathering our logical conclusions:
Collecting all the conclusions thus far that logic has led us to, we can infer that unless instances of evil and injustice are merely subjective violations of personal ‘truth’ and fancy, there must be some ultimate moral absolutes that are being violated, that span human individuals, societies, history and geography and these must originate from some other mind that, itself, has free will and is intensely interested in how humans behave.
But we need a source that is, essentially, morally perfect.
One last criterion:
If I were to suggest a possible non-human mind, the question would be, "But is that candidate the best one, or will it be flawed?" It is here that a concept discussed by philosopher Alvin Plantinga comes into play. The moment you ask that question, you assume there has to be a maximally excellent set of moral laws against which all other moral values can be compared, where Plantinga's 'maximal excellence' means 'that degree of excellence beyond which it is not logically possible to be more excellent.' (2)
A maximally excellent mind is neither arbitrary nor does it need some other set of moral laws to comply with, else it would fail to qualify for that degree of excellence beyond which it is not logically possible to be more excellent. Such a mind, itself, becomes the flawless standard of truth and beauty (see my article on Euthyphro’s Dilemma (3)).
It reminds me of one of my favorite descriptions of God ...
"Every good thing given and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights, with whom there is no variation or shifting shadow." (4)
Pure light, goodness, and perfection with no variation––unwavering and steady––flawless truth, beauty, justice, and rightness. And thus in our logical journey, we come back to our initial question that was our starting point ... is evil and injustice an actual violation of an ultimate standard of truth and beauty––or is evil and injustice an imaginary violation of subjective fancy? Your choice will have enormous logical implications that are worlds apart.
Notes and References:
Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene.
Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil.
Kirk Durston, ‘Euthyphro’s Dilemma’.
Note: If you would like to dive a little deeper into what it means to be human, you may be interested in another article I wrote on that topic.
